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“Plato’s Equivocal Wisdom”
Mary Lenzi, U. of Wisconsin, Platteville 
Paper presented to the SAGP at its 2005 meeting with the Central Division o f the APA
Socrates and Plato do not speak or write in one voice about wisdom, yet their altogether 
unique theorizing about it represents the focal point of the West’s first philosophy, philosophia 
as the “love of wisdom.” Significantly, then, Plato’s differing notions and wordings for wisdom 
throughout his dialogues must be continually revisited and reexamined. Tentatively, I adopt 
Gilbert Owen’s wording and senses of “univocal” and “equivocal,” which he used in relation to 
Aristotle’s philosophy, only as a heuristic guide, to inquire into Plato’s own ‘equivocal’ senses of 
wisdom.1 Because Plato has no ‘univocal’ or single-minded sense of wisdom, it is critical to 
revisit certain claims and assumptions about his contrasting and complementary usage of terms, 
their meanings, and importance for his overall theory of wisdom. By so doing, his philosophy 
emerges in clearer sight.
By this analysis, some of these claims are re-evaluated and overturned. Of particular 
interest are those views that have been formerly accepted as developing or changing from Plato’s 
Republic to the Laws regarding the kind of wisdom, hence also the philosophy necessary to guide 
the State. My interpretation diverges at key junctures from some of the standard interpretations 
of the meaning and significance of these changes.
First, we can agree that clear differences are to be found between Plato’s depiction of 
philosophical wisdom and the philosopher rulers in the Republic and in the Laws. By way of 
preliminary background for these changes, Plato’s depiction of the kind of philosophic wisdom 
necessary for political leadership, at the same time, also reflects the underlying nature, 
constitution, and values of their different forms of political society and government. As a result 
of these Platonic interconnections, Plato’s description of the nature of political society, and his 
characterization of philosophers as political leaders contain further reason and evidence for his 
making novel developments in the theory of wisdom between the Republic and the Laws.
Instead of dividing and breaking away from theories in earlier dialogues, Plato’s final views 
actually serve to advance, broaden, and perhaps unify his overall conception of wisdom and 
philosophy.
A new interplay between sophia andphronesis emerges in Plato’s conception of 
wisdom in later dialogues that is quite different from his views in early and middle dialogues. 
First {Part I), the present inquiry shows that sophia no longer represents primarily theoretical, 
philosophic wisdom as it does in the Republic (and as Aristotle defines it). Rather, according 
to the reading and interpretation of the texts presented here, sophia becomes closely akin to 
Plato’s earlier conception of wisdom in relation to temperance (sophrosyne) in his Socratic 
dialogues, in that the highest inner harmony and virtue necessarily require sophia qua self- 
knowledge. Second {Part //), this analysis further aims to show that these claims about 
wisdom are unlike Plato’s views in other dialogues, and also unlike the accepted scholarly 
interpretations of the virtues in the Laws. Third {Part ill), Plato implies that phronesis is 
necessary to complete sophia, which, as will be shown, is primarily an interpersonal type of
1Owen, G. E. L. (1970).
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virtuous wisdom. Phronesis does so by encompassing not only theoretical, philosophic 
knowledge, but for the first time, a new version of practical, political knowledge.
PARTI
As brief background to these interpretations, one may recall that according to scholarly 
dogma, the many fine, and precise distinctions about different sorts of human wisdom remain 
implicit and tentative in Plato’s dialogues: It remained for Aristotle to make those 
distinctions explicit and precise. Moreover, it is commonly thought that phronesis and sophia 
are synonymous terms for Plato’s notion of wisdom, and that ‘sophia’ may be merely a “more 
honorable name” for ‘phronesis.’2 Aristotle then is reputed to be the first philosopher 
explicitly to define phronesis as practical wisdom, and sophia as theoretical wisdom. As 
shown below, this standard opinion does not take into sufficient account Plato’s last dialogue, 
the Laws, wherein the meaning and application of these two terms for human wisdom diverge.
This failure to recognize the ways phronesis and sophia are clearly differentiated in the 
Laws is but one example of how misconstruing Plato’s theories in the Laws, and, in addition, 
the relation of the Laws to other dialogues prevents us from appreciating the full course and 
development of the Platonic conception of wisdom. From early, to middle, to late dialogues, 
Plato conveys diverse views of wisdom, both in theory and also as exemplified by different 
kinds of wise individuals, such as (a) Socrates, (b) philosopher-kings and queens in the 
Republic, and (c) philosopher-rulers and legislators in the Laws.
In the Republic, wisdom represents the highest form of philosophical knowledge and 
virtue. In the Laws, it is frequently claimed (incorrectly, as demonstrated below) that wisdom 
assumes some lower form. For instance, R. F. Stalley (1983) argues that Plato’s 
“mouthpiece,” the Athenian Stranger, “seems to rely on the accumulated experience of 
humankind rather than on any form of specialist knowledge.”3 One commentator, Ernst 
Zeller (1876) has gone so far as to claim that wisdom in the Laws is based solely on the 
harmony between reason and desire.4 If this latter claim were valid, wisdom would become 
difficult to distinguish from temperance, sophrosyne, also commonly defined, and understood 
in terms of the same such harmony. Perhaps following Zeller’s nineteenth-century 
assessment, many twentieth-century commentators also argued that in the Laws temperance 
{sophrosyne) is made “tantamount” to virtue, or that the other virtues, including wisdom, 
become subordinate to temperance.5 Because inner harmony characterizes the virtue of 
temperance in the Republic and in the Laws, it would then appear that Plato’s theory of 
wisdom (and consequently of all virtues) has radically changed. No longer seen as 
philosophical wisdom,6 wisdom would then appear to be lowered to the level of mere
2 Gorgemanns, p. 154.
3.Stalley, p. 48.
4. Zeller, pp. 524-525, p. 529.
5. Muller, pp. 16-19; Barker, p. 344; North, p. 187; Hall, p. 92; Klosko, p. 199; Stalley, p. 55.
ó.Zeller, pp. 529-530; cf. pp. 533-534; Stalley, p. 9, p. 30; Muller, p. 96; pp. 18-19. Gorgemanns (I960), however, calls
2
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temperance.
Further still, another horn of this inquiry shows that, in his other dialogues, Plato 
appears to make no distinction between sophia and phronesis. He uses ‘sophia’ primarily to 
indicate the virtue of wisdom in the Apology and the Protagoras. In the Republic, Plato uses 
‘sophia’ to indicate theoretical, philosophic wisdom (Republic 428cl2-d3; 429a 1-3). Yet he 
also less frequently uses the term ‘phronesis’ to indicate theoretical wisdom: twice for 
example, in the Phaedo (69b3; 69c 1 ), and twice in the Republic (559b 11; 621c6). In brief, 
Plato seems to use both terms synonymously when discussing wisdom as the highest and best 
state of knowledge and virtue.7 8
Because commentators have thus interpreted Plato as consistently drawing no
o
meaningful distinction between these two terms throughout his writings, both phronesis and 
sophia thereby become further wrongly equated with harmony (symphonia) and temperance 
in Plato’s last dialogue, the Laws. Consider the following passage:
“For without harmony (.symphonia)... how could even the smallest fraction of wisdom 
(phronesis) exist? It is impossible. But the greatest and best of harmonies {symphonia) 
would most properly be accounted the greatest wisdom {sophia)” (689d5-9).
Plato seems to use the terms,4phronesis’ and ‘sophia' interchangeably to indicate wisdom, 
understood here as the “best harmony,” symphonia. Thus, commentators9 understandably 
find it difficult to avoid concluding that Plato equates wisdom with harmony in the Laws.
Yet, can it be valid to suppose that Plato would equate any virtue, such as wisdom, with 
the psychological state underlying that virtue within the soul, namely, harmony (symphonia)? 
Simply put, for Plato these two represent different facets of someone’s character. For 
instance, a virtue and its underlying psychological state are not interchangeable in theory or in 
actuality: One cannot collapse into or replace the other. Hence, I suggest that the difference 
in the meanings of symphonia (harmony), phronesis, and sophia (cited above: 689d5-9) can 
be explained by entertaining a possible paraphrase of Plato’s text as follows.
For without harmony {symphonia) as a condition of the human soul, how could there be 
any fraction of wisdom (jjhronesis) within the soul? However, the greatest condition of 
harmony in the soul represents the greatest self-knowledge {sophia)!
this view of wisdom “meaningless,” and instead proposes that “moral insight” offers a better, and truer, meaning of 
phronesis in the Laws. According to his interpretation, moral insight comes from understanding the fundamental 
principles of law, and Plato’s Laws suggests that such insight is necessary to bring about the harmony of reason and 
desire, pp. 148-151. A more recent commentary by Zdravko Planinc ( 1991 ) also seems more consistent with an 
alternative interpretation of Plato’s theory of virtue in late dialogues.
7,Stalley claims Plato’s usage implicitly follows Aristotelian distinctions between phronesis and sophia, p. 48.
8Allen, R. E. (1965); Bambrough, J. R. (1965); Fine, G. (1988).
3
9.Specifically Muller, pp. 16-19; Gorgemanns, p. 144.
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Such a paraphrase serves well to clarify the distinctions called into question by the present 
analysis, in that, as I strongly suggest, phronesis and sophia point to different aspects of 
wisdom, each of which is related uniquely to harmony, that is called “symphonic!.” The key 
difference is: Sophia more directly implicates temperance and psychic harmony than 
phronesis does in the Laws (688b).10
Further evidence for this interpretation is present in the Laws. Consider Plato’s 
statement that the ‘commander’ of symposia (wine-drinking dinner parties) “should be wise 
(p hr ones is) about social gatherings.... Then the commander we set over drunken men should 
be sober and [self-disciplined] (sophos) ... [not] a commander of drunkards who was himself 
drunken, young, and foolish (not sophos)” (Laws 640c9-d7). These uses of ‘phronesis’ and 
‘sophos’ (to indicate ‘wise’) do not seem synonymous: *Phronesis’ in this case may imply 
the ‘commander’s’ possession of some form of knowledge about “social groups” that is based 
upon experience or intellectual training, whereas ‘sophos’ may indicate the virtue of sophia, 
which (as discussed below) represents the greatest psychic harmony resulting from a person’s 
self-knowledge.
PART II
Before this rendering of Plato’s final view of wisdom can be further defended, surely 
Plato’s varying notions of sophia need to be made more comprehensible, that is, within the 
context of his other dialogues. For the present analysis, it is fruitful to start with Plato’s last 
work, the Laws, and work back to his earlier dialogues.
In the Laws Plato implies that sophia primarily involves the harmony between reason 
and desire in the soul: “Wise (sophos) [is] the person who has feelings of pleasure and pain in 
accord with the dictates of right reason and is obedient thereto” (696c; 653b7-9). In another 
passage (819a), he claims that a person without extraordinary intelligence is still wise and 
good, if he or she possesses a harmonious soul and properly trained desires. Plato further 
argues:
“Those shall be held in reproach for their ignorance [my reading: ‘lack of harmony between 
reason and desire’], even though they be expert calculators, and trained in all 
accomplishments and in everything that fosters agility of soul, while those whose mental 
condition is the reverse of this shall be entitled ‘wise’ (sophos), even if -  as the saying goes -  
‘they spell not neither do they swim,’ and to these latter, as to persons of sense, the 
government shall be entrusted” (Laws 689c7-dl0).
Here, I argue, Plato rejects his notion in the Republic that a philosophic, political leader must 
have exceptional, inborn intelligence, and also have undergone rigorous intellectual training 
to become good and ‘wise.’ Fie seems to imply that a person hardly needs to be a philosopher 
to rule society effectively and wisely. However, below (Part III) we will see why this is not 
the case (Laws 71 le-9-712a4; 969b5-c5; Republic 473d; 515c5-516b7).




Further analysis shows that Plato ultimately uses the term *sophia' to convey wisdom in 
the form of self-knowledge, and not merely as a high level of virtuous inner harmony and 
self-discipline (Cf. Laws 718e). I would suggest that this rendering of sophia coheres best 
with similar passages found in other later Platonic dialogues, -Sophist (230a, 233a); 
Theaetetus (176c), and in the early, so-called ‘Socratic’ dialogues. The passages below from 
the Laws also show Plato most insistent on this particular meaning of sophia in his last work:
(1) “It is from this same ‘sin’ [i.e., ‘erroneous or excessive love of self] that every person has 
derived the further notion that one’s own folly is wisdom (sophia); whence it comes about 
that though we know practically nothing, we fancy that we know everything” (732a6-b4).
(2) [‘Double’ ignorance is when] “the folly is due to the person being gripped not by 
ignorance only, but also by a conceit of wisdom (sophia)” (863c5-7; 952c6; 962e).
Someone who has self-knowledge correctly knows what he or she can and cannot do, 
for only such a person has the proper assessment of his or her own abilities and specific 
limitations. Such a person would be least likely to overstep the boundaries of one’s 
knowledge and capabilities. In particular, Plato argues that the immoral person lacks 
self-knowledge, and is thus the victim of a “double ignorance”: Not only is someone 
ignorant; most importantly, one is deceived in thinking oneself to be wise. Plato implies that 
only a clear-thinking person, one possessing true self-knowledge can know what is best for 
oneself, and hence be a trust-worthier member of society (more trustworthy, that is, than 
someone without such wisdom).11
Nevertheless, although self-knowledge was a necessary condition for the virtue of 
sophia in other Platonic dialogues, it certainly was not the sufficient condition. In the Laws, 
however, self-knowledge seems to become the necessary and sufficient condition for sophia. 
Plato does not even mention ‘sophia’ in relation to philosophic or theoretical wisdom in the 
Laws;12 he uses *phronesis’ for this sense of wisdom. As this analysis reveals, the Laws 
instead focuses primarily on ‘sophia ’ as ‘self-knowledge’ that is crucial for the highest 
psychic and interpersonal harmony. [In addition, it is interesting merely to note here, that 
when Plato refers to craft-knowledge (technai: arts, skills, and sciences), he uses the term 
‘sophia ’ (Laws 677c; 689d; 747a-c).] These meanings and the present analysis of sophia 
in the Laws, whereby sophia primarily represents ‘self-knowledge,’ further exemplify the 
unique contributions of Plato’s overall philosophy of wisdom and human virtue. It seems 
useful then to suggest that Plato’s vision harks back to the nature of Socratic wisdom found in 
an early dialogue, the Char mides, wherein temperance is identified with wisdom. At one 
point, Socrates claims: “This is wisdom and temperance (sophrosyne) and self-knowledge— 
for someone to know what one knows, and what one does not know” (Charmides 167a5-6). 
Ultimately, Socrates appears not to accept this view, apparently because such wisdom entails 
ignorance in the Charm ides (169e-170a2). Nevertheless, the understanding that both wisdom
11 .This same view reflects one aspect of wisdom in the Republic, namely, that sophia indicates genuine self-knowledge, 
and that only such knowledge benefits oneself in relation to others (Republic 442c5-8).
5
12.To analyze this aspect of sophia would entail yet another direction for inquiry and interpretation.
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and temperance are equivalent to self-knowledge is again dominant in the Laws', yet, this 
theoretical connection no longer seems to fall into the same conundrums.
It would be simplistic, though tempting, to argue that Plato in the Laws comes to accept 
the view he rejects in the Charmides. Yet Charmides and the Laws are dialogues with very 
different purposes: Charmides aims to define ‘sophrosyne,’ while the Laws aims to define 
and present a different conception of wisdom, and the other virtues, for citizens, philosophers, 
and political society. It must be highlighted that, according to the analysis above, wisdom 
includes self-knowledge, but temperance need not include wisdom in the theoretical and 
practical Platonic senses of philosophical and political knowledge in the Laws.
As pertinent background, Plato espouses this same view of sophia in the examination of 
the wisdom of Socrates in the Apology. In particular, Socrates’ possession of self-knowledge 
sets him apart from others. It seems to explain the oracular statement that he was wiser than 
any other human being (21d9). Thus, one finds that Plato’s philosophy represents a complete 
circle: In these respects, anyway, it ends where it begins. Plato’s portrayal of the wisdom of 
Socrates points us to an inexplicable, or indeterminate, inner state of soul which Socrates 
himself regrettably admits to having no ‘specialist’ kind of knowledge to share, or to pass on 
directly to others. Socratic wisdom {sophia) entails both self-knowledge and ignorance, in 
that such wisdom includes understanding and accepting any one individual’s inherent 
incompleteness in the face of absolute and certain knowledge of reality.
PART III
Now one can closely evaluate a more unorthodox view claimed by this inquiry: that is, 
in Plato’s Laws, phronesis may be taken as a more complete kind of wisdom. Accordingly, 
phronesis complements and extends Plato’s final view of sophia, which, in turn, has become 
primarily associated with interpersonal wisdom and virtuous self-knowledge.
First, in making the case for this view (and interpretation), note that only in the Laws 
does Plato use ‘phronesis’ to indicate ‘wisdom’ whenever he lists the virtues (630ab; 631c; 
906b3; 964b6; 965d2; also, in the listing in Sophist 247b 1). Plato also seems to use 
‘phronesis’ to indicate the virtue of comprehensive human wisdom regarding both theoretical 
and practical reason. Gorgemanns’ key commentary on the Laws (1960) seems to add 
credibility to the view at hand, for he argues that, in the Laws, phronesis and nous (reason) are 
often interchangeable words and virtues (631c6; 631d5; cf. 961el-962c3; 963a 1 l-b3).13 
However, this otherwise important observation can be taken too far, as Gorgemanns and 
Stephen Menn (1996) seem to do, by construing the connection between nous (mind; reason) 
and wisdom simply to imply that Plato equates human reason itself with its corresponding 
virtue, namely, phronesis.l4
13. Gorgemanns, pp. 152-153.
14. Like all virtues, phronesis, as the virtue of wisdom, is attainable only by human beings, precisely because our mind 
and reasoning is nothing neither more nor less than human, though capable of having divine aspirations. Further, see 
recent work of Stephen Menn, (1992; 1995).
6
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Second, to the contrary, nous (reason) seems to have a wider range of meaning and 
import than is found in Plato’s usage and meaning of the term and virtue of phronesis. For 
instance, in the Laws, nous means:
(1) to simply have sense or reason (see 693b4, c3, c7, with 701 d9; 687e5-7 with 688b6-7; 
688e6-7 with 687e8-9);
(2) the immortal element of mind in human beings (713e8-714a2);
(3) divine reasoning embodied in legislation (713e);
(4) the cosmic and divine principle of Mind in the universe (Book X).
The most telling evidence to advance the interpretation (as I propose here) is that, only in 
Plato’s Laws does wisdom qua phronesis come to encompass practical philosophical and 
political “knowledge” (Laws 951b), as possessed by philosopher-lawmakers and rulers 
(961d-962; 964d3-10; 963a9-10; 965a 1-2). By contrast, in the Republic, Plato uses ‘sophia’ 
to indicate the philosophical, political virtue of wisdom (428cl2-d3; cf. 429a 1-3).
Further, unlike Plato’s theory in the Republic, in the Laws, Plato’s theory of phronesis 
(wisdom) also includes the newly formulated philosophical arts of judicial and aesthetic 
judgment (659a4; 656a2; 690b 10; cf. 627e-628a5), legal rhetoric, and, most important, the art 
of law making. Finally, the complete wisdom of philosopher-rulers and legislators is also to 
include, or be derived from, philosophical, dialectical understanding of unchanging reason 
and principles underlying legislation, the cosmos, and the gods (967d4-968a4).
In the Laws, the practical aspect of wisdom, as included in the term and virtue of 
phronesis, is directed at the political art of legislation. Both the practical political arts, and the 
philosophical training and knowledge of philosopher-rulers aim to impart the ability to be 
“expert” legislators, who create and change law for the better (see 770a5-10; 770b4-cl ; 
769a9-el; 803a; 858a-b). The Nocturnal Council is the central legislative body of the 
government of the State in the Laws (964c-e).15 *All members of this Council hold political 
and legal offices and possess significant political skill, experience, and powers. These 
legislative, ruling officials of the State must face their own challenge when pursuing political 
wisdom: to target and to hit the overriding aim of the many particular and diverse laws of the 
State. As Plato states, “If someone were to be plainly ignorant as regards the political mark to 
be aimed at, would that person, first of all, deserve the title of magistrate, and secondly,... be 
able to secure the salvation of that object concerning the aim of which one knows nothing at 
all (962a8-b2)?” Because of their practical, political training along with their philosophical 
studies, Plato believes that the Nocturnal Council would be better able to comprehend the 
overall aim of legislation and to find the means to implement it (962bl-c2; cf. 962d7-
7
15.Barker thinks that the Nocturnal Council contains 40 members, p. 400, Note U2. Morrow claims that the number of
members is “much smaller” than 75, p. 223.
Lenzi p. 8
963a5).
The other key aspect of the philosopher’s legislative and executive wisdom is rhetoric.17 
Rhetoric is the art needed to fulfill the central practical aim of legislation to impart virtue, and 
thereby to bring about both individual and social justice in individuals and in society. Plato 
observes, “For of all studies, that of legal regulations, provided they be rightly framed, will 
prove the most efficacious in making the learner a better person; for were it not so, it would 
be in vain that our divine and admirable law bears a name akin to reason” (957c3-10; 714a; 
835a).18 Hence, rhetorical Prefaces before the laws must be written that aim to instill well- 
reasoned virtue and principled citizens, and to instill mutual understanding and respect 
between citizens and their elected officials.19 Otherwise, social and political harmony in the 
State would not be achieved rationally or freely.
For citizens to become just, Plato’s Laws strongly maintains that citizens must do more 
than internalize the actual restrictions and allowances of the Laws themselves. It is equally 
important, or even more so, that they internalize the rationale underlying laws. Thus, the 
political, philosophical arts of law making and rhetoric are indispensable parts of the wisdom 
{phronesis) of philosopher-rulers, if they are to fulfill one of the central aims of legislation. 
Along with civic friendship, “the lawgiver must try to implant in the state as much wisdom 
(phronesis andsophia) as possible (688b3; 687e8; 688e5; 693c4).
In addition, for Plato, one cannot understand the world, oneself, and human society 
without ongoing investigations and theoretical accounts along cosmologie and theological 
lines. Recall that in Phaedo Plato argued that when the soul communes with the unchanging 
Forms, it is in a state “called wisdom” (79dl-8). Thus, Book X of the Laws attempts to 
demonstrate that when the philosopher contemplates and understands how the Rational 
World-Soul communes with the Forms and the Good, his or her soul will be in a state called 
‘wisdom.’ My examination (1993) stands in contrast to the common interpretation that 
Plato’s theology is essential more for the good of the State than for its own intrinsic value: 
Contrary to the claims of other scholars on Plato’s Laws, such as Stalley (1983), Planinc
16.Plato likens the philosopher-ruler of the Council to an expert crafts-person, since both must know the “one” in order 
to organize everything with a single eye towards it (965b5-c4).
17.In contrast to the Laws, in the Statesman Plato argued that the art of rhetoric does not specifically belong to art of the 
Statesman (304c8-el).
18. Plato makes a rhetorical pun between ‘nous-nomos’ (‘reason-law’), even though there is no valid etymological 
connection between these two words.
19. According to Plato’s view, virtue results primarily from rational persuasion and the educative factor of an explanatory 




(1991), Seung (1996), without his theology, Plato does not have a complete theory of wisdom, 
of virtue, or of philosophic leadership in the Laws.20
Conclusion
Ultimately, for Plato, this strikingly broad view of wisdom in the Laws is consistent 
with a life-long effort to articulate common links between practical and theoretical knowledge, 
on the one hand, and virtue on the other. The possession of philosophical wisdom always 
involves more than knowing that something is true, good, and just, and even more than 
knowing why. The possession of practical wisdom necessarily involves the ability to 
implement this knowledge in practice in one’s own life, in human society, and in relation to 
gods (see Republic 539d8-540bl0; 509a). In light of these diverse readings and their 
interpretations, one discovers a new interplay between sophia and phronesis in Plato’s theory 
of wisdom in the Laws, one that is quite different both from Plato’s earlier views of wisdom, 
and from Aristotle’s distinctions between practical and theoretical wisdom.
To recapitulate the findings of the foregoing analysis, Plato’s final theorizing shows 
critical developments and refinements. Notably, sophia no longer represents primarily a 
theoretical, philosophical wisdom, as it does in the Republic, and as it becomes exclusively 
defined by Aristotle. Rather, sophia is closely akin to Plato’s own earlier conception of 
wisdom in relation to temperance in his Socratic dialogues. In his final view of these same 
virtues, Plato still maintains that the highest (or best) inner harmony requires sophia, which is 
to be understood as psychic and interpersonal self-knowledge. Yet, unlike his previous views, 
Plato prefigures Aristotle in his notion of phronesis. In the Laws, phronesis is thereby 
necessarily enlarged in definition, broadened in range and application, because it represents 
the wisdom and philosophy required for philosophers, qua lawmakers and rulers, to meet the
• * 91requirements of a partly democratic society, government, and citizenry.
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